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Abstract This chapter asks whether insurance instruments, especially micro-
insurance and regional insurance pools, can serve as a risk-reducing and equi-
table compensatory response to climate-attributed losses and damages from climate
extremes occurring in developing countries, and consequently if insurance instru-
ments can serve the preventative and curative targets of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). The discussion emphasises the substantial
benefits of both micro-insurance programs and regional insurance pools, and at the
same time details their significant costs. Beyond costs and benefits, a main message
is that if no significant intervention is undertaken in their design and implementa-
tion, market-based insurance mechanisms will likely fall short of fully meetingWIM
aspirations of loss reduction and equitable compensation. Interventions can include
subsidies and other types of support that make insurance affordable to poor clients;
interventions can also enable public-private arrangements that genuinely catalyse
risk reduction and adaptation. Many such interventions are already in place, and the
chapter highlights two potential success stories for insurance instruments serving
the most vulnerable: the African R4 micro-insurance program and the African Risk
Capacity (ARC) regional insurance pool. While support to these and other insur-
ance programs continues to be framed as humanitarian aid based on the principle
of solidarity, discussions on the G7 initiative to insure vulnerable households, as
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well as on ARC’s initiative to link international payments to climate risks, raise the
question whether the narrative will evolve from solidarity to responsibility based on
the principle of developed country accountability.
Keywords Risk transfer · Financial instruments · Climate change · Catastrophic
loss · Safety nets · Disaster risk reduction · Equity · Liability · Compensation
21.1 Introduction
Insurance has played a central role in discussions on adapting to the impacts of
climate change, dating back to the early 1990s, when the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS) proposed a global insurance fund to compensate small islands for sea-
level rise (see introduction byMechler et al. 2018). Taking stockof this history, aswell
as the accumulated experience with catastrophe insurance instruments, this chapter
asks if insurance mechanisms can help serve the intent of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and Article 8.1 of the Paris Agreement of
‘averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change, including extremeweather events and slowonset events…”
(UNFCCC 2015, Article 8). The focus is on weather and climate extremes, including
droughts, floods, windstorms and other hazards impacted by anthropogenic climate
change, which occur in particularly vulnerable developing countries.
Although the precise intentions of the WIM are still unclear, and especially its
distinction from climate adaptation (see chapters by Mechler et al. 2018; Schinko
et al. 2018), the WIM Executive Committee (2016) emphasises the role of insurance
in furthering climate risk management, or more specifically its role in proactively
reducing and transferring risks. In addition, and importantly, discussions on Loss
and Damage (L&D) and the WIM have extended to adaptation limits and ‘beyond
adaptation‘ (Schäfer et al. 2018). According to the UNFCCC, loss and damage
“includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by
adaptation” (Decision 2/CP.19, UNFCCC 2014). This has been interpreted by many
WIM commentators, and especially developing country parties, to suggest compen-
sation for climate-attributed losses and damages experienced by the most vulnerable
communities (see Mace and Verheyen 2016). A legal obligation to compensate for
residual loss and damage (the climate-attributed losses and damages that remain
once all cost-effective and socially/politically feasible measures have been imple-
mented (UNFCCC 2012) is ruled out in the Paris Agreement (Paragraph 52), yet not
for the broader debate, where residual losses and damages resulting from climate-
related extremes raise ethical issues concerning retribution or (non-legally binding)
compensation (see also Simlinger and Mayer 2018). In line with the discussion in
Mechler and Schinko (2016) and the chapter by Schinko et al. (2018) we refer to
risk reduction and (non-legally binding) compensation as preventative and curative
responses, respectively, and explore the role of insurance instruments in promoting
these responses.
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In simple terms, insurance allows one party (the insured or policyholder) to trans-
fer the risk of future economic losses to a second party (the insurer) willing to bear
this risk for the payment of a premium. By transferring the risk ex ante, insurance
clients are guaranteed payments for the agreed upon losses and damages from events
ex post. In this way insurance, as one of a number of risk financing instruments, pro-
vides reimbursement in return for the payment of a premium such that households,
businesses, governments and whole regions can recover in a timely way from the
damages from extreme events. In addition, many argue that insurance goes beyond
post-disaster reimbursement to pro-actively prevent damages from occurring (see
chapter by Schäfer et al. 2018). By ‘pricing’ risk and requiring preventative mea-
sures, insurance provides (in theory) incentives or conditions for clients to adopt
damage-reducing behaviour and make investments to reduce their risks.
Insurance thus appears to serve the goals of disaster risk reduction (DRR) as well
as post-disaster reimbursement. If insurance payouts are viewed as compensation
for losses and damages, insurance serves as a preventative and curative instrument,
therefore responding to WIM aspirations as (differently) voiced by developed and
developing country parties (see chapter by Calliari et al. 2018). It is not surprising,
then, that insurance has figured so prominently in the L&D discussions and work
plan. However, while these insurance characteristics have motivated the discussions
on insurance as a tool to address climate-attributed losses and damages, they raise
questions essential to the WIM deliberations. Most fundamentally, can insurance
be viewed as an equitable curative measure for climate-attributed impacts and risks
incurred by poor communities in vulnerable countries? This in turn raises questions
concerning burden sharing: How are premiums determined and who pays them?
Another central question concerns the disaster-risk-reduction (DRR) potential of
insurance. Are insurance instruments, as they are currently practiced, effective in
encouraging prevention and risk reduction by incentivising or requiring adaptation
and resilience investments?
By examining these and other questions, this chapter explores the extent to which
insurance—provided through private markets or public institutions—can meet the
differentiated WIM ambitions of reducing and compensating for Loss and Dam-
age. The discussion focuses on recent evidence from micro-insurance and regional
sovereign insurance pools as these are the most common types of catastrophe insur-
ance currently operating in developing countries, which has given them a particular
standing the L&D discussions.
After an overview of catastrophe insurance and its role for loss and damage
from climate change (Sect. 21.2), the discussion turns to the benefits and costs of
insurance (Sect. 21.3), before it examines insurance as a tool for preventing the
economic impacts from extreme weather events (Sect. 21.3) and for reimbursing
the residual loss and damage (the curative aspect) (Sect. 21.4) with examples from
micro-insurance programs and regional insurance pools. The chapter concludes (in
Sect. 21.5) that insurance instruments based on the ‘mutuality principle’ (premiums
reflect risk plus markup or ‘load’) will fall short of meeting the ‘preventative’ and
‘curative’ aspirations underlying theWIMand Paris Agreement; however, insurance
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based on the ‘solidarity’ and ‘accountability’ principles accompanied by significant
outside interventions can indeed support WIM objectives.
21.2 Insuring Climate Risks: An Overview
21.2.1 Brief History
Reference to insurancewas firstmade by theAlliance of Small IslandStates (AOSIS),
which suggested in 1991 that an international insurance pool funded by industrialised
parties be established to compensate small-island and low-lying developing nations
for impacts resulting from sea level rise (INC 1991; chapter by Mechler et al. 2018).
The insurance mechanism proposed by AOSIS was not aimed at establishing private
sector risk transfer, but geared towards a compensation fund to address L&D from
sea level rise. As such, it was not strictly insurance in a technical sense, but a com-
pensation mechanism (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2003). What remained from these
early discussions is reflected in Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC, which calls upon Par-
ties to “consider” actions, including those related to insurance, to meet the specific
needs and concerns of developing countries with respect to the adverse impacts of
climate change (United Nations 1992). In subsequent years, AOSIS as well as other
organisations, such as the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), developed
proposals for the use of insurance mechanisms to address climate change impacts
and risks (AOSIS 2008; MCII 2008). Notably, both the AOSIS and MCII propos-
als brought a compensatory or curative mechanism for loss and damage in through
the back door by including a risk layer in the insurance arrangement that would be
fully financed by developed countries; although not differentiating between climate-
change attributed impacts and other risk drivers. In addition, both proposals called for
increased financing for DRR projects as part of a holistic climate risk management
approach. The proposals informed the negotiating text at COP 15 in Copenhagen
in 2009, and went on to influence negotiations on the L&D mechanism at COP 19
in Warsaw in 2013. Subsequently, insurance has featured prominently on the WIM
agenda, most notably on the workplans of the WIM executive committee (ExCoM)
(UNFCCC 2014, 2016).
Recognition of insurance as a potent response to climate risk has been subse-
quently underscored by the G7 InsuResilience initiative, and recently upgraded to
theG20 andV20 partnership (most vulnerable 20 countries), which ambitiously aims
at insuring 400 million currently uninsured people in vulnerable countries by 2020
(G7 2015; InsuResilience 2017). Interestingly, these efforts to enhance the role of
insurance in addressing disaster and climate risks in developing countries occur pre-
dominantly outside the UNFCCC’s L&D discussions and are increasingly presented
as part of broader development support.
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Fig. 21.1 Overview of ‘risk management applications’ of insurance, in the context of loss and
damage . Adapted from Warner et al. (2012)
21.2.2 Can Insurance Cover All Loss and Damage
from Climate Change?
It should be emphasised that insurance cannot provide financial protection against all
impacts from climate change (Warner et al. 2009). As shown in Fig. 21.1 insurance
is an instrument for financing the recovery from extreme and non-gradual climate
events, like floods, windstorms and droughts, but is not suited for managing the dam-
age caused by slow-moving or gradual changes that include, among other impacts,
sea-level rise, desertification, loss of habitat, loss of biodiversity, erosion, ocean
acidification and glacial retreat (chapter by Bouwer 2018). At the same time, these
slow climatic changes can becomemanifest through insurable rapid-onset events, for
example, sea-level rise exacerbates storm surge levels and coastal flooding. Equally
difficult to insure are small-scale events for which damages are mostly expressed in
the cumulative wear-and-tear of assets and infrastructure (Moftakhari et al. 2017).
Insurance thus has clear limitations, as it can only cover those events that are suf-
ficiently random and infrequent in their occurrence. Finally, as shown in Fig. 21.1,
the range of loss events (rapid-onset to gradual) is accompanied by a range of pol-
icy support instruments for risk reduction or reimbursing impacts—from support
for insurance instruments (e.g., public subsidies or reinsurance) or insurance-linked
prevention, to reparations for gradual onset impacts.
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21.2.3 Spectrum of Ex Ante and Ex Post Financing
Instruments
Insurance is not the only measure to ensure post-disaster financial resources, and in
some contexts other mechanisms can be more appropriate and cost-effective. It is
therefore important not to view insurance as a stand-alone solution but consider if
and how it can be part of a holistic climate risk management approach. In contrast to
wealthy countries, insurance mechanisms for providing catastrophe cover are still in
their infancy in the developing world. The percentage of losses from natural hazards
covered by private or public insurance in 2014 in the US and Europe were 42 and
34%, respectively, compared to only 1.4% in Africa and 12.5% in Asia (Swiss Re
2015). The extent to which insurance can be offered is risk and country-specific and
dependent mainly on income.
Table 21.1 provides an overview of financial instruments and arrangements avail-
able to cover disaster risks facing (i) households, farms and small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) operating at the local or micro scale, (ii) financial- and donor-
organisations operating at the intermediary scale, and (iii) governments operating at
the national or macro scale.
Table 21.1 Examples of risk financing arrangements at micro, intermediary and macro scales
Micro-scale
Households/SMEs/Farms
Intermediary-scale
Insurers/financial
institutions/donor
organisations/NGOs/Agro-
Businesses/Cooperatives
Macro-scale
Governments
Insurance
instru-
ments
Indemnity–based
property, crop & life
insurance, index-based
(parametric) property,
livestock & crop
insurance, weather
hedges, national insurance
programs
Indemnity and parametric
insurance for NGOs,
co-ops, Re-insurance for
direct insurance providers,
catastrophe bonds,
sidecars
Sovereign risk transfer
(e.g., sovereign
re-insurance, catastrophe
bonds, sidecars),
contingent credit, regional
catastrophe insurance
pools
Solidarity Government assistance,
humanitarian aid
Government
guarantees/bail outs
Bi-lateral and multi-lateral
assistance, EU solidarity
fund
Savings
and credit
Savings, micro-savings,
micro-credit, fungible
assets, food storage,
money lenders
Emergency liquidity funds Reserve funds,
post-disaster credit
Informal
risk
sharing
Kinship and other mutual
arrangements, remittances
Diversions from other
budgeted programs
Source Adapted from Linnerooth-Bayer et al. (2010)
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Lacking insurance, vulnerable households and other local actors have tradition-
ally financed post-disaster recovery with a combination of savings and credit, infor-
mal kinship arrangements, government relief and international donor support. Sav-
ings can take the form of stockpiles of food, grains, seeds and marketable assets,
which serve to smooth consumption during crises. The most common form of assis-
tance is remittances, which are more than three times the size of official develop-
ment assistance (World Bank 2016), and can be a significant contribution to post-
disaster recovery. Banks, insurers and othermonetary financial institutions (MFIs), as
intermediary-scale actors, can also protect their post-disaster liquidity by purchasing
reinsurance, relying on bail outs from the government, or support from institutions
like the African Emergency Liquidity Facility (OMTRIX 2005) or the World Bank.
Governments as national operators can meet their obligations to repair public
infrastructure and support needy households with ex post and ex ante instruments.
Typically, and as detailed in Table 21.2, public authorities seek financing after dis-
asters occur, for instance, by issuing tax increases, re-allocating funds from other
budgeted activities, or borrowing through issuing bonds. Governments of highly
exposed countries may also rely on assistance from the international community.
An example of the latter is the significant support provided by the World Bank,
and in Europe the European Union Solidarity Fund provides post-disaster support to
governments to support their recovery (Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2017).
In addition to these ex post instruments, governments increasingly anticipate dis-
aster events with ex ante financing or risk transfer as shown in Table 21.2. Risk
financing at sovereign level includes a wide range of tools such as national reserve
funds, sovereign insurance (also offered through regional pools), and credit and cap-
ital market products, such as catastrophe bonds, where bond purchasers agree to
forfeit interest or principle if a pre-defined hazard or disaster occurs (see Cardenas
et al. 2007). Such a catastrophe bond (150Million USD), for example, was triggered
by the 2017 Oaxaca earthquake (ARTEMIS 2017b). Insurers make use of other types
Table 21.2 Financing instruments for protecting government budgets
Financial and budgetary instruments
Goal Ex ante instrument
[arranged before a disaster]
Ex post instrument
[arranged after a disaster]
Risk retention
[changing how or when one
pays]
Contingency fund or
budget allocation
Budget reallocation
Line of contigent credit Tax increase
Post-disaster credit
Risk transfer
[removing isk from the
balance sheet]
Traditional insurance or
reinsurance Indexed insurance,
reinsurance, or derivatives
Discretionary post-disaster
relief
Capital market instruments
Source Clarke and Dercon (2016)
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of alternative instruments, such as reinsurance sidecars, where investors act directly
as reinsurers, and risk swaps, options and loss warranties. Most of these alternative
instruments provide an opportunity for investors in the capital markets to take a more
direct role in providing insurance and reinsurance protection.
21.2.4 Types of Insurance
Insurance, whether for health, unemployment or climate-related disasters, is a central
feature of most wealthy countries; yet, institutional arrangements can differ signifi-
cantly depending particularly on the degree of private-market responsibility. In this
discussion, we distinguish between private-market insurance, public-private insur-
ance arrangements, and public assistance. Private-market insurers underwrite the
risks, and clients are asked to pay their full or close-to-full risk-based premium,
albeit often with cross-subsidies from low-risk to high-risk clients that keep the pre-
miums affordable (e.g., flood insurance in Germany, Norway and the U.K.). At the
other end of the spectrum is public assistance, which can take the form of a catas-
trophe reserve fund financed from general taxes (e.g., in Austria) from which loss
reimbursement can be legally binding (e.g., earthquake relief in Italy) or non-legally
binding and ad hoc (e.g., in Hungary). In between these two ends of the spectrum
are many public-private arrangements. Public institutions are active, for instance, in
underwriting insurance (e.g., the US National Flood Insurance Program), providing
subsidies and other support to private insurance programs (e.g., the Austrian crop
insurance system), or supporting commercial insurers with reinsurance arrangements
(e.g., the French all-hazard insurance system).
Insurance can be indemnity-based, where products are written against actual
losses, or parametric, where products are written against a physical index (e.g.,
soil moisture), that is, against events that cause loss, not against the loss itself.
A parametric instrument disburses funds based on a triggering event that reaches
a pre-determined threshold of a quantifiable measure (for example, wind speed or
precipitation), which importantly is not conditional on an on-site loss assessment.
Semi-parametric schemes are also written, where the trigger is a combination of a
hazard and its calculated/modelled impact based on known exposures and vulnera-
bilities (Molini et al. 2007).
Because they target themost vulnerable in the developingworld and have featured
prominently in the L&D discussions, two types of insurance are highlighted in this
chapter: (1) micro-insurance that offers cover to households, farms and SMEs, and
(2) regional sovereign risk pools providing support for national governments. The
intent of micro-insurance is to make insurance accessible by avoiding the high costs
of traditional insurance in order to service resource-poor markets, usually by offering
limited cover and greatly reducing transaction costs (Mechler et al. 2006). The intent
of regional sovereign risk insurance pools, including those already formed in the
Caribbean, Pacific Islands and Africa, is to ensure needed and timely liquidity post-
disaster.
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21.3 The Benefits and Costs of Insurance
21.3.1 Benefits of Insurance
The central feature of insurance is its risk-pooling capacity. By pooling risks from
a sufficiently large and independent number of individual households, farms, busi-
nesses and even sovereign states, insurance collectively reduces loss volatility (math-
ematically speaking, the variance of losses) and in this way can guarantee post-
disaster liquidity to those individuals at risk (Kunreuther 1998). The assurance
of post-disaster liquidity, in turn, can reduce impacts, including disaster-induced
bankruptcy, hunger, selling of productive financial assets or taking kin out of school
with long-term impacts on human capital formation. If correctly implemented insur-
ance thus delivers risk pooling over space and time; faster and more efficient recon-
struction; certainty about post-disaster support; and can reduce immediate welfare
losses and consumption reductions (Brainard 2008; von Peter et al. 2012).
An important advantage of insurance over many other types of risk financing is
the timeliness of the post-disaster payments. A study by Clarke and Hill (2013) sug-
gests that rapid payouts and prompt assistance to affected populations can reduce the
impact of disasters and enable poor and vulnerable people to recover more quickly.
Examining experience of pro-poor insurance instruments shows that they have been
an effective risk management tool in terms of providing timely payments post-event
(Arent et al. 2017). Moreover, an insurance contract can be a more secure and timely
means of coping with disasters than dependency on ad hoc and often delayed gen-
erosity of governments and donors. To add to these benefits, insurance can render
clients more creditworthy, and in so doing promote investments in productive assets
and higher-risk/higher-yield activities, in turn reducing disaster-related poverty traps
(Hallegatte et al. 2016).
Turning to governments, sovereign disaster risk financing instruments including
insurance pools aim at protecting public budgets in the wake of disasters. Due to lim-
ited tax bases, high indebtedness and low uptake of insurance, many highly exposed
developing countries cannot fully recover by simply relying on limited external donor
aid. Ex post liquidity through insurance enables governments to provide relief to the
most vulnerable and to invest in reconstruction and recovery, thus reducing long-
term losses and development setbacks from disasters. Sovereign risk transfers can
also indirectly benefit households and other victims of disasters. With internation-
ally backed risk-transfer programs, developing country governments will rely less
on debt financing and international donations, and assured funds for repairing criti-
cal infrastructure can attract foreign investment. Finally, and importantly, insurance
instruments may provide incentives to reduce risk (Newsham et al. 2011; Heltberg
et al. 2009a, b), but only if they do not encourage behaviour that neglects to reduce
risks in a cost-effective way, a common concern in insurance applications often
referred to as ‘moral hazard.’ The preventative capacity of insurance instruments is
the topic of Sect. 3, where we examine their risk-reduction potential in practice.
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21.3.2 Costs of Insurance
While there are substantial benefits provided by privately or publicly offered insur-
ance, the costs of insurance are considerable. The average financial cost of insurance
generally surpasses average losses, meaning that un-subsidised insurance premiums
are greater than what the client expects to lose. For this reason, clients should care-
fully consider the costs and benefits, and rely on insurance only after considering the
alternatives, or in the words of Vaughan and Vaughan (2008, p. 62), only as a last
resort. Indeed, without outside subsidies and other forms of support policyholders
can expect, on average, a higher financial burden in the long run with insurance
than without it. That insurance results, on average, in greater costs to those insured
is often not appreciated and needs further explanation.
The insurance premium tends to be inflated above the ‘actuarially fair value’ or
‘pure premium’ (expected losses) due to the fact that on top of the annual expected
losses a risk premium is charged. As shown in Fig. 21.2, the risk premium is deter-
mined by two factors: expense load and risk load (Pollner 2000). Additionally, in the
case of private insurance a profit margin is charged. In general terms the expense load
reflects the costs of the insurer doing business, and the risk load includes the cost of
holding capital, reinsurance and of assuming uncertain contracts for high-level risks.
The risk load distinguishes catastrophe insurance from other types of insurance, like
life and health, since insurers covering catastrophic risks must be prepared to pay
claims for disasters that affect whole regions or countries at the same time (co-variate
risk). Still, if insurers are sufficiently diversified, the risk load will not only insulate
them from large losses at one time, but will also in the long run result in significant
profits.
Fig. 21.2 Costs contributing to catastrophe insurance premium Source Adapted from Cummins
and Mahul (2009)
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The ratio of the premium paid versus the coverage obtained gives an indication
of the insurance cost, particularly when comparing insurance to other risk financing
tools. Using this ratio, Ghesquiere and Mahul (2010) found that risk transfer is very
costly compared to most other financial instruments (Ghesquiere and Mahul 2010;
Clarke andDercon 2016).As a case in point, in theCaribbean region annual insurance
premiums (paid mostly by businesses) were estimated to represent about 1.5% of
GDP during the period 1970–1999, while average losses per annum (insured and
uninsured) accounted for only about 0.5% of GDP (Auffret 2003).
If insurance premiums cost clients on average more than their anticipated losses,
and in the case of co-variant catastrophic events significantly so, why do house-
holds, businesses and governments insure? This question is particularly pertinent
for resource-poor households and governments, where premium payments can have
high opportunity costs. The textbook rationale for purchasing insurance, verified by
evidence on insurance penetration, is based on the concept of “risk aversion”. Risk-
averse persons and entities (generally people who cannot cope with large losses) are
willing to pay more than they expect to lose on average to avoid catastrophic losses.
Households and farms in developing countries are likely to be highly risk averse since
large losses can threaten livelihoods and lives (and thus have severe costs and other
implications beyond the sheer financial loss). The same holds for the public sector
since disasters can significantly affect development if governments do not have the
means for rapid reconstruction and relief efforts (Mechler 2004).
For middle- to high-income earners in developed as well as developing coun-
tries an insurance value proposition can often be discerned as shown by substantial
insurance demand, yet it is pertinent to ask how insurance mechanisms can serve
resource-poor clients facing high risk? As current programs demonstrate, insurance
premiums are made affordable by targeting higher income clients, implementing
cross subsidies, limiting coverage, providing outside support and forming partner-
ships (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2010). Whereas most discussions focus largely on
making insurance affordable, it should be recognised that it may not be advisable
from a benefit-cost perspective. Indeed, reliance on alternative financial arrange-
ments, like donor solidarity, savings, credit and remittances, can be considerably less
costly than insurance, and these arrangements can work reasonably well for low-loss
events (Cohen and Sebstad 2003). However, they can be unreliable and inadequate for
covariate and catastrophic shocks that place a significant financial strain on whole
communities, regions and governments. Insurance theory and recent cost-benefit
assessments indicate that insurance and other risk financing instruments are mainly
advisable, and viable, for large and residual risks that cannot be reduced or retained
otherwise.
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21.4 Preventative Response: Does Insurance Support
the Risk-Reduction Response to the WIM?
Many analysts argue that insurance can go beyond enabling ex post relief, recon-
struction and recovery, to be an ex ante tool for promoting risk reduction (Kunreuther
1996;Kunreuther andMichel-Kerjan 2009; Crichton 2008; Botzen 2013). According
to the chapter by Schäfer et al. (2018): “Insurance spurs transformation by helping
countries reshape the way risks are managed. It does so by encouraging risk reduc-
tion, catalysing risk assessment, and drivingmore structured decision-making around
ex-ante risk”. Despite these claims, some commentators, including NGOs and par-
ties to the UNFCCC, remain sceptical that insurance goes beyond risk spreading to
risk reduction, and worry that insurance can even lead to a false sense of security
or moral hazard if the insured, by not bearing the full costs of risky decisions, take
on more risk (Vellinga et al. 2001; UNFCCC 2008). Moral hazard is widely recog-
nised, and insurers address it through the design of insurance products by using
deductibles or parametric products; however, questions remain whether insurance
products lead directly to risk reduction. According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), insurance can “directly provide incentives for reducing
risk, yet the evidence is weak and the presence of many counteracting factors often
leads to disincentives…” (Chambwera et al. 2014).
Building on Surminski and Eldridge (2015) and Surminski (2014), Lorant et al.
(forthcoming) identify ways in which the contractual elements and ancillary mech-
anisms of insurance can (in concept) encourage risk reduction. After surveying the
developed-country practices of flood insurers, the authors note the disappointing
evidence of a strong link between insurance and DRR and suggest ways that insur-
ers can contribute more effectively, for example, making better use of hazard maps,
monitoring household risk improvements, rewarding risk mitigation with premium
discounts, inserting conditions or warranties into contracts, and developing protocols
that will better link risk inspections of large facilities with underwriting practices.
Beyond these design changes, there is evidence that public insurers invest more
in preventative risk reduction than their private insurer counterparts (Schwarze and
Croonenbroeck 2017; Ungern-Sternberg 1996). The evidence on the insurance-DRR
link for the on-goingwork under theWIM is that indemnity-based insurance as prac-
ticed in wealthy countries may need adapting if it is to be applied as an instrument to
foster reduction of loss and damage in developing countries. A similar conclusion
was reached by the IPCC, where authors confirmed that risk-financing mechanisms
contribute to increasing resilience, but that major design changes would be needed
to avoid providing disincentives for DRR (Chambwera et al. 2014). As we witness
in wealthy countries, progress will be slow and patchy without public and private
commitment to shaping insurance systems such that they foster practices that lead
to investment in disaster risk reduction practices.
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21.4.1 The Experience of Micro-insurance in Promoting
Risk Reduction
Themessage that insurance practices will require reform if they are to better promote
risk reduction holds not only for indemnity-based systems in wealthy countries, but
also for parametric micro-insurance systems that are increasingly targeting resource-
poor clients in the developing world (for reviews, see Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2012;
Mechler et al. 2006; Schäfer andWaters 2016).Already in 2010, therewere a reported
36 parametric weather insurance programs, including 28 addressing individual farm-
ers/herders, residents of informal settlements, village or cooperative risk (Hazell et al.
2010), with many other programs having appeared since then (Schäfer and Waters
2016).
Parametric systems are notable for the absence of moral hazard. The insured
remain motivated to reduce their losses and damages because insurance disburse-
ments, if they are triggered, are not based on actual losses. For example, a farmer
with a parametric insurance contract, which pays out if rainfall falls below a pre-
defined level, can gain doubly by planting drought-resistant crops since the farmer
will have less losses and still receive a pay-out. Beyond the elimination of moral haz-
ard, the literature on parametric micro-insurance makes little reference to specific
risk-reduction requirements, for example, in the form of conditions or warranties,
and there are few accounts of micro-insurers informing clients of hazards or advising
them on risk-reduction activities.
One notable positive exception is the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) that
offers micro-insurance for drought risk to food-insecure communities in Ethiopia,
Senegal, Malawi and Zambia (see Box 21.1). R4 currently reaches over 40,000 farms
through a combination of its four risk-management strategies: The first, R1, promotes
improved resource management (risk reduction); R2 supports microcredit (prudent
risk taking;); R3 is insurance (risk transfer); and R4 is savings (risk reserves). The
most unique and interesting feature of this initiative is its direct link to the reduction
of crop loss from drought. In lieu of paying aa premium, cash-constrained farmers
can opt to participate in an insurance-for-assets (IFA) plan, whereby they pay the
premium through their labour on projects that reduce risk in the community, such
as field irrigation projects and tree planting (World Food Programme and Oxfam
America 2016). It should be noted, however, that the R4 Program operates with
generously subsidised premiums, even to those not participating in insurance-for-
assets, and cannot be compared to a market-based insurance program.
R4 is exemplary by providing a proven insurance system design that promotes
DRR, especially since the risk management experiences of most micro-insurance
programs suggest that they could become a more powerful DRR tool with carefully
designed interventions by governments or donors. Importantly, the ability of those
most vulnerable to reduce their own risk and to change their behaviour may be very
limited or not feasible unless supported by donors.
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Box 21.1 R4 Rural Resilience Initiative for drought risk management
Countries: Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia
Partners: farmers, local relief society, insurers, reinsurers, rural banks, university, gov-
ernment and donors
Policy holders: 40,000 Smallholder farmers’ livelihoods in
drought-prone regions with a sum insured of USD 2.2 million, premiums of USD
370,000, and payouts USD 450,000 (2015)
Fig. 21.3 The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative
Integrated risk management framework
– Improved resource management (risk reduction)
– Individual/group savings (risk reserves)
– Microinsurance (risk transfer)
– Microcredit (risk taking)
Insurance-for-work program to supplement the government’s “food and cash for
work” Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
Work program includes projects for reducing risk and building climate resilience, such
as improved irrigation or soil management.
Source World Food Program & Oxfam America 2016; World Food Programme 2017
21.4.2 The Experience of Regional Risk Pools in Promoting
Risk Reduction
The first of three regional sovereign risk pools, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), was created in 2007 as a multi-government disaster risk
pooling arrangement with the aim of providing sovereign insurance coverage for
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hurricanes and earthquakes to its participating member countries (UNISDR 2017).
A second regional pool, Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) was established in 2012 as
a specialised agency of the African Union to help member states improve their
capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to natural disasters (Wilcox 2014).
Recently, a third regional sovereign risk pooling arrangement has been created for the
Pacific island states, thePacificCatastropheRiskAssessment andFinancing Initiative
(PCRAFI) (World Bank 2017). In all three cases, disbursements from the pool go to
participating governments for the purpose of supporting their post-disaster relief and
reconstruction efforts, although only one of the pools (ARC) makes requirements on
how the disbursements are used by requesting its members to provide details about
contingency management and disbursement when they join the pool.
A key feature of all three pools is the parametric nature of the insurance contract,
which, as discussed for micro-insurance, makes payments faster and the claim pro-
cess less costly than traditional indemnity-based insurance products for which claims
are paid based on assessments of loss through on-site verification. Fast payment of
claims is especially critical. Intervening quickly after a disaster can provide gov-
ernments with funds that support households and prevent the adoption of damaging
coping strategies (such as selling off or slaughtering livestock). A benefit-cost anal-
ysis carried out on the ARC shows that getting aid to households in the critical three
months after harvest can result in economic gains of over USD 1,200 per household
assisted (Clarke andHill 2013). CCRIF announced that its payouts to Caribbean gov-
ernments due to the impacts of Hurricane Irma, which devastated many island states
in September 2017, will reach $31.2 million, and the facility has now passed $100
million of payouts to members since its launch. All of the $100 million of payouts
were made to members within 14 days of the catastrophe events that triggered their
parametric insurance policies (ARTEMIS 2017a).
Advancing ex ante risk management is also important in all three regional pro-
grams, especially with respect to developing the knowledge base on which disaster
risk reduction and management policy can be pursued. Each pool makes an effort,
paid for by donors, to measure and quantify disaster risk in the relevant region by
examining not only the hazard but also exposure and vulnerability using detailed
mapping, data and modelling tools developed explicitly for this purpose. An exam-
ple is ARC’s modelling platform called African Risk View. It provides modelling
input to ARC for insurance purposes, but also aims to be a financial early warning
tool, supporting government decision-makers with cost estimates before and during
a drought season. As such it can trigger early action and risk reduction measures.
The models and quantification of risk constitute major progress as private markets
and the governments of the region were not supplying this information previously.
If combined with technical assistance and capacity building these advances in risk
information can lead to a culture of riskmanagement across governments, potentially
inducing a more anticipatory approach to risk (Vivid Economics et al. 2016).
ARC is currently preparing for the launch of an additional tool, the Extreme Cli-
mate Facility (ARC-XCF), which aims to address adaptation and resilience shortfalls
in African countries in the face of climate change. XCF is designed to take account
of increasing risk of extreme weather event activity in order to disperse funds to be
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used to invest in risk-reduction activities (Wilcox 2014, see Box 21.3). This tool,
requested by ARC member countries, offers an interesting approach to linking the
risk transfer structure of ARC to climate adaptation and risk reduction investment.
Notwithstanding the paramount importance of assessing risks to countries in the
pool and providing timely post-disaster funds, the regional pools have put into place
very few explicit incentives or funds for reducing disaster risks. There are some
requirements with regard to usage of pay-outs and emergency management, yet as
shown in the case of ARC, there are no conditions for proven disaster and climate
risk reductions. CCRIF has a disaster risk management function, but it focuses on
reducing downstream losses after a disaster has occurred by providing immediate
liquidity. In practice, then, beyond the data collection and modelling aspects (though
only the ARC provides open source risk data), there is very little evidence that the
regional pools shape DRR and climate adaptation policy in their member countries.
To conclude, it appears that more can be done to design regional sovereign risk
pools that contribute to the preventative aspiration of theWIM, although the proposed
ARC XCF offers an interesting proposition for this purpose. Design reform of the
pools might include a requirement for detailed contingency plans for pre-disaster risk
reduction and (in the case of CCRIF and PCRAFI) making risk data open source. The
implementation of these plans could be made a requisite for continued membership
in the pool.
21.5 Curative Response: Does Insurance Promote
the Equitable Compensation Response T the WIM?
The WIM extends beyond aspirations for disaster risk reduction to include climate-
attributed loss and damage that cannot be effectively reduced. This has raised aspira-
tions especially among highly vulnerable developing countries that a form of (legally
non-binding) compensation for residual climate impacts may be in the offing. The
question in this section is whether insurance, by reimbursing loss and damage from
climate disasters, contributes to the ‘equitable compensation’ or curative aspirations
for the WIM?
At the outset, it is worth emphasising that financial instruments, including insur-
ance, are not neutral as to how disaster costs are shared. Risk-based instruments
that require premiums or payments from those in the insurance program can shift
responsibility to vulnerable households and communities and away from social insti-
tutions that may have previously aided reconstruction; in contrast, informal or public
mechanisms, like remittances or reserve funds, share losses usually across family
members and taxpayers. For insurance programs, it should be asked if the insured,
themselves, pay the risk-estimated premium thus putting the full burden on their own
at-risk communities (and at the same time providing incentives for them to reduce
their risks). Alternatively, are there arrangements, like cross subsidies, that allocate
this burden differently within the risk pool, or are there arrangements, like transfer
payments, that allocate the burden at least partially to those outside the risk pool?
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21.5.1 Equity Principles in the Compensation of Loss
and Damage
The essential question for the L&D discussions is then “who pays the premium?”
To address this question in Box 21.2 we distinguish three principles of fundamental
importance for organising insurance arrangements, each principle building on a dif-
ferent view of equity. Private market-based insurance, unless it is subsidised from
outside or within the pool, operates on the principle of mutuality and thus does not
share losses beyond the at-risk insured community. Private insurers may deviate from
themutuality principlewith premium cross-subsidies, e.g., by charging their wealthy,
lower-risk clients higher premiums tomake policies affordable to low-income clients
in high-risk locations. Sometimes this means a flat or undifferentiated premium that
helps high risk (and often lesswealthy) clients and avoids the costs and administrative
burdens associated with differentiated premiums. In some cases, regulation dictates
how private insurers can set premiums, usually to safeguard affordability. In India,
for example, commercial insurers are required to offer ‘pro-poor’ policies, which
they finance by charging their wealthy clients a higher rate. Without these forms of
subsidy in a mutuality-based system the policyholders, themselves, can expect (in
the long term) to pay premiums that are approximately equivalent to their received
claim payments (actuarially fair premiums), plus significant additional costs (loads
shown in Fig. 21.2). Thus, in an insurance system based on mutuality, there is no
reimbursement to the victims of disasters (on average) outside of what they, them-
selves, contribute in premiums; in other words, the at-risk community finances its
own curative measures. This is an important and often misunderstood feature of the
insurance mechanism, and arguably disqualifies commercial insurance as a curative
measure as intended by the WIM.
Solidarity can take many forms, including subsidised or cross-subsidised pre-
miums, reinsurance or other forms of assistance that reduce premiums paid by the
most vulnerable. It is the fundamental principle underlying pre-disaster assistance
and post-disaster humanitarian relief and reconstruction (see Schinko et al. 2018).
Support can come from, among others, governments, NGOs, financial institutions
or international development organisations. Indeed, almost all micro-insurance pro-
grams and macro-level pools operating in developing countries receive some type of
donor or government support (Vivid Economics et al. 2016). Importantly, solidarity,
in contrast to accountability, need not appeal to a causal relationship between his-
torical greenhouse gas emissions and loss and damage, or culpability on the part of
those providing support for insurance instruments.
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Box 21.2 Three equity principles for organising insurance
Mutuality
Mutuality is at the core of the insurance concept, according to which the insured par-
ticipate in a disaster pool according to their risk class (and pay a risk-based premium).
The pool then pays those insured in accordance with the scale of their losses. Mutuality
is the primary principle underlying private, market-based insurance; clients enter the
pool usually voluntarily, and pay according to the best estimate of the risk they bring
with them. While insured agents receive payments from the pool depending on their
losses, in the long run (and on average) they pay their own reimbursement, and more,
since the premium is based on expected loss plus the additional insurance loads shown
in Fig. 21.2. According to this principle, there are no transfer payments within the pool
or from outside the pool (Wilkie 1997).
Solidarity
Solidarity is a profoundly different concept in that losses are paid according to need,
and contributions to the pool are not made fully in accordance with the risks that the
applicants bringwith them, but perhaps partly according to ability to pay, or just equally.
Solidarity can result from cross subsidies among those in the pool. It can also take the
form of payments by those not in the pool, for example, aid agencies can subsidise
micro-insurance schemes. Importantly, solidarity is based on the concept of voluntary
transfers for humanitarian or other grounds; there is no underlying notion of liability.
The concept of solidarity thus corresponds to the concept of distributive justice discussed
in Wallimann-Helmer et al. (2018).
Accountability
Accountability as a concept differentiates itself from the solidarity principle in one
important aspect; here, it is motivated by a perceived ethical or legal obligation for
compensating those experiencing climate-attributed losses and damages. Accountabil-
ity links an actor’s actions with outcomes, either causally or legally (Honoré 2010)
where the allocation of responsibility is based on causation and (often but not always)
fault or negligence. Being accountable not only means being responsible for climate-
attributed impacts and risks but also ultimately being answerable for them.
A far more controversial and potent principle to underlie support for insurance
instruments is accountability for loss and damage, which mirrors the “polluter-pays
principle” that is invoked across many environmental issues. Accountability invokes
questions of attribution (James et al. 2018) as well as some degree of culpability or
fault. Both can be difficult to assign to state and other actors since the science is not
sufficiently precise to estimate increased risk of losses and damages due to emissions
of greenhouse gases, and fault for emissions can be questioned due to historical
knowledge and other factors (Burkett 2014). The assignment of accountability for
losses and damages, and ultimately responsibility, has been understandably resisted
because of fears of legal liability. Indeed, the Paris Agreement explicitly rejects that
the treaty provide a basis for liability or compensation (Simlinger and Mayer 2018).
Yet, as Lees (2016) argues, the refusal to contemplate liability should not lead to a
refusal to contemplate the allocation of ethical responsibility—what he refers to as a
responsibility allocation mechanism. Indeed, recognition of ethical responsibility, as
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differentiated from legal liability, may be necessary, if not essential, for motivating
even voluntary support for insurance instruments on the scale contemplated by the
L&D discussions.
Principles of solidarity and accountability are strongly voiced in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that parties should act to
protect the climate system “on the basis of equality and in accordance with their com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (United Nations
1992). A fundamental element of this principle, which is restated in the preamble
to the Paris Agreement, is the need to take account of the different circumstances,
particularly each State’s contribution to the problem and capacity to remedy it (Deci-
sion 3/CP.19). TheWIM, likewise, refers to the need to take account of differentiated
responsibility (accountability) for losses and damages (Lees 2016). The principles
set out in the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement suggest that those bearing responsi-
bility for losses and damages, and those most capable of addressing it, should bear
some obligation to contribute to insurance premiums for climate-attributed risks in
highly vulnerable countries. In fact, many developing country Parties and NGOs
have advocated the accountability principle. The submission of CARE to the current
WIM work plan is illustrative:
…(WIM) should apply principles of global equity, including taking into account a “polluter
pays”-based approach to generating finance for addressing loss and damage from countries,
companies and institutions who significantly contribute to the causes of climate change
through fossil fuel emissions (CARE International 2017).
Invoking responsibility/accountability in the discourse on developed country sup-
port (but avoiding legal liability) changes the paradigm of post-disaster support
from ‘charity’ to ‘amends’, which has significance in terms of allocating funds
beyond humanitarian assistance budgets. Arguably, a responsibility-based discourse
can change the motivation for assisting victims of climate-attributed impacts and
risks—so essential to implementing the Paris Agreement and maintaining its volun-
tary, cooperation-focused approach (see chapter by Schinko et al. 2018).
21.5.2 Experience of Micro-insurance for Equitably
Allocating the Impacts and Risks Burden
Almost without exception micro-insurance schemes that serve the resource-poor are
subsidised either by national taxpayer funds or, more often, by international donors,
international financial institutions,NGOs and official development assistance (Mech-
ler et al. 2006; Schäfer and Waters 2016). Few private insurers are optimistic about
the prospects of providing non-subsidised insurance to clients below the poverty
level (Swiss Re 2012).
As one example, India’sNationalAgricultural InsuranceScheme (NAIS), globally
the largest micro-insurance crop program, targetsmainlymiddle-income farmers and
is heavily subsidised by Indian taxpayers (Mechler et al. 2006). As another example,
the pro-poor R4 initiative discussed above is made possible by the significant support
it receives from NGOs and donors as well as its reliance on funds (in Ethiopia)
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from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program and theWorld Food Programme. An
innovative micro-insurance program for herders inMongolia is affordable and viable
to insurers due to its layered system of responsibility and payment, including herders
(who retain small losses or the lowest risk layer), the private insurance industry (risk-
based premium payments for the middle layer of risk) and taxpayers (for the highest
risk layer). In addition to subsidies, micro-insurance is typically made affordable
by greatly reducing the cover offered. A micro-insurance program in Bangladesh,
Proshika, that insures savings against natural disasters limits claims to twice the
amount in the client’s savings account (Mechler et al. 2006). Similarly, a micro-
insurance project in Malawi was made affordable by limiting cover to the cost of the
hybrid seeds, which protects the banks against defaults for their seed loans, but does
not protect households against drought losses (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009).
The extensive support for micro-insurance falls thus solidly under the insurance
principle of solidarity, where contributions to the pool are made, not in accordance
with the risks that applicants bring to the pool, but typically according to their ability
to pay the premium. Climate-attributed impacts and risks will likely continue to be
framed as a humanitarian issue invoking solidarity, and not as an issue invoking
accountability or liability.
21.5.3 Experience of Regional Insurance Pools for Equitably
Sharing the Impacts and Risk Burden
The question addressed in this section is to what extent the regional insurance
pools (CCRIF, ARC and PCRAFI) provide their members with an equitable curative
response to climate-attributed losses and damages, keeping in mind that the pools
provide cover to governments, which in turn (and in varying degrees) provide post-
disaster support to vulnerable households, farms and SMEs. By ‘equitable’ we again
refer to the three principles relevant to insurance: mutuality, solidarity and account-
ability. We ask, thus, who pays the price for membership in the risk pools, and based
on which equity principle?
All pools have received donor support, mostly through capitalisation, payment
of operational expenses, direct premium support or capacity building. While the
premiums are therefore less than would be required without outside support, in the
case of ARC and CCRIF the relative premiums (the proportion eachmember country
pays to the pool) tend to be based on risk levels (i.e., there are no cross subsidies).
The pools are thus based on solidarity from the outside, butmutuality in determining
the relative payments from members. For ARC, all insured countries pay premiums
based on risk estimates, while for setting up and operating the pools support comes
from donor organisations. In other words, donors contribute to reducing some of
the loads on the insurance premium. ARC’s non-profit mutual insurance company
(not necessarily meaning the premiums are based on mutuality) is capitalised by
financial and development institutions, including the German Development Bank
and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which means that
premiums are indirectly supported through a solidarity principle. For ARC, thus,
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there are elements of mutuality in setting country-specific trigger points and caps,
which largely determine premiums, and also elements of solidarity given substantial
donor support.
The PCRAFI, in contrast, bases premiums largely on ability-to-pay of its member
countries rather than a calculated risk. Thismeans there are substantial cross subsidies
across member states. In addition, multiple development partners and IDA credit
have contributed to the establishment of the pool as well as to premium support.
The PCRAFI is thus based primarily on the principle of solidarity in terms of both
outside- and inside-pool support.
Interestingly the principle of accountability has not been invoked in justifying the
contributions of the donor community to these systems, even though climate change
is a concern to all regional pools. However, not surprising after the devastating
2017 Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the attribution of the covered hazards to climatic
change is under investigation for CCRIF and the other pools. More specifically, as
an innovative proposition, ARC is setting up an Extreme Climate Facility (XCF) that
would be capitalised by the international community if trends in extreme weather are
found attributable to climate change (Wilcox 2014). Thus, theXCF can be considered
a manifestation of climate change risk, although there is no direct discussion of this
facility extracting payments based on greenhouse emissions from wealthy countries,
and thus no direct appeal to the accountability principle.
Box 21.3 The ExtremeClimate Facility (XCF) of the African Risk Capacity (ARC)
Function
Additional financing for countries alreadymanaging their current weather risks through
ARC.
Data-driven modus operandi
Payments to countries will be entirely data-driven over a 30 year period—if there is
no significant increase in extreme events over current climatology, then no payment is
made.
Climate Adaptation
Countries must use payments to invest in DRR or climate change adaption measures
specified in pre-defined country level adaptation funds.
Scale
Payment size would increase with extreme event number andmagnitude over and above
a pre-specified threshold, corresponding to the degree of confidence that extreme events
are increasing due to climate change.
Action focus
Leveraging ARC’s existing infrastructure, XCF will ensure that countries and the inter-
national community properly monitor climate shocks and are financially prepared to
undertake greater adaptation measures should their frequency and intensity increase.
Source Wilcox (2014)
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21.6 Summary: The Evolving Insurance Narrative
This chapter has asked whether insurance instruments, and particularly micro-
insurance and regional insurance pools, can serve as a risk-reducing and equi-
table compensatory response to climate-attributed losses and damages from weather
extremes occurring in developing countries, and consequently if insurance instru-
ments can serve the preventative and curative targets of theWIM and the Paris Agree-
ment? As background, the chapter recognises that insurance, by dealing exclusively
with residual, sudden-onset event risks, can be only one part of the L&D response.
The discussion has emphasised the substantial benefits of both micro-insurance
programs and regional insurance pools: micro-insurance for providing post-disaster
relief and reconstruction and also pre-disaster security (so important for adaptation
and escaping poverty); regional insurance pools for decreasing the costs of rein-
surance for governments and enabling early disbursement of emergency relief that
saves lives, reduces distressed productive asset sales and mitigates disaster-induced
poverty traps. The discussion has also emphasised the significant costs of insurance,
noting that insured households and governments will on average pay considerably
more for climate insurance than they expect to lose from extreme climate events.
Notwithstanding the benefits and costs, the discussion has examined insurance
instruments for their role in meeting the curative and preventative aspirations for
theWIM—equitably compensating for residual climate-attributed impacts providing
strong incentives or directives for reducing risks.Amainmessage from this discussion
is that absent significant intervention in their design and implementation, insurance
mechanisms as currently implemented will likely fall short of fully meeting WIM
aspirations as (differently) expressed by developed and developing country Parties.
This message is detailed in Table 21.3, which provides the mechanisms by which
insurance can in principle support WIM responses.
Recent experience shows that with some important exceptions indemnity and
parametric programs (mainly public-private partnerships), beyond pricing risk and
reducing moral hazard, have few explicit incentives or requirements for risk reduc-
tion, even if their potential is promising. Reforming insurance programs for improved
loss reduction can build on recent successful experiences, particularly evidence of
significant risk-reduction activities on the part of public insurers compared to their
private insurer counterparts, and innovations and developments in risk pricing and
engineering, along with more targeted use of limits, deductibles and warranties. Still,
as we witness in wealthy countries, progress will be slow and patchy without public
and private commitment to shaping insurance systems such that they foster practices
that lead to investment in disaster risk reduction practices.
A similar message emerges regarding the curative aspirations for theWIM. Insur-
ance based on the principle of mutuality (typically private, market-based insurance),
unless subsidised or otherwise supported, does not share risk beyond the at-risk
insured community. There is thus no reimbursement of losses to the victims of disas-
ters (on average) outside of what policyholders, themselves, contribute in premiums,
which disqualifies mutuality-based insurance as a curative mechanism meeting vul-
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nerable country aspirations for theWIM.Mutuality, however, is not a feature of most
donor-supported micro-insurance and regional insurance pools.
A challenge with the solidarity principle, if premiums are subsidised, is the less-
ened incentive for policyholders to reduce their risk. In meeting this challenge, inter-
national financial institutions, development agencies and other donors will need to
reconcile the contending equity and preventative objectives in their support of cli-
mate insurance programs.This is foremost a challenge in designing “smart” insurance
programs that are considered equitable and at the same time provide incentives or
directives to their clients to reduce risks.
Two often cited success stories for insurance instruments serving the most vulner-
able the African R4 micro-insurance program and the African Risk Capacity (ARC)
regional insurance pool, go a long way in combining these goals. Neither is a com-
mercial insurance enterprise; neither is (fully) characterised by risk-based premiums;
and both are highly subsidised. The R4 program’s success has been attributed in large
part to its close connection with public safety net programs in the participating coun-
tries, and the ARC can attribute its success largely to its required disbursement plans.
As evidence of extreme climate-attributed impacts and risks becomes more widely
available and accepted, ARC’s innovative XCF program may serve as a conduit for
institutionalising donor support in the form of increased pool capitalisation.
The provision of support to regional insurance pools and micro-insurance pro-
grams continues to be framed as humanitarian aid, not invoking accountability or
liability for climate-attributed loss and damage. Indeed, support for insurance pro-
grams has come mainly from development and financial organisations, such as the
World Bank, national development partners, and international NGOs, with empha-
sis on the potential role of insurance in supporting poverty reduction in the face of
climate and disaster risks. In other words, the narrative for support has been framed
as a humanitarian and development issue.
The insurance discoursemay, however, be changing. This is perhapsmost apparent
in discussions on the recent G7 Initiative onClimate Risk Insurance (InsuResilience),
which has the ambitious goal of increasing access to direct or indirect climate insur-
ance coverage for up to 400 million of the most vulnerable people in developing
countries by 2020 (G7 2015; InsuResilience 2017). While InsuResilience does not
officially commit to any specific equity principle, there are a number of voices that
raise this aspect. One example is the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), a
close advisor to InsuResilience. MCII is forthright about the need to ground finan-
cial support in ethical claims of accountability and also capability. In the words of
this NGO (whose members include insurers, NGOs and researchers), InsuResilience
should provide technical and financial support to the set-up and maintenance of risk
facilities and pools, the capitalisation of national and regional risk pools and other
forms of co-financing premiums. This support should follow the principles of “ca-
pability, including sharing the risks imposed by climate change and responsibility
for climate change impacts” (Schäfer and Waters 2016). The G7 initiative has thus
unleashed a broad-ranging discussion on who should pay for insurance, sovereign
risk transfer and social protection systems in light of climate change. In a commen-
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tary in Nature Climate Change, Surminski and colleagues (2016) explicitly raise this
issue:
As the intensity and frequency of climate extremes increase, is it fair to shift responsibility
on to those who are the least responsible for climate change, the least able to shoulder the
premiums, and in many cases the least able to reduce their losses?
As the recentG20/V20Global Partnership on InsuResilience (launched atCOP23)
shows, the need for donor support is increasingly accepted by the development
finance community. Importantly, this financial support should be ‘smart’, under-
stood as reliable, flexible, minimise incentive distortions, and make the recipients
aware of the true cost of the covered risk (Schäfer and Waters 2016). In this way,
subsidised insurance can be linked to risk reduction (Hill et al. 2014; Vivid Eco-
nomics et al. 2016). As a concrete proposal, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009)
have argued that the subsidy should take the form of an insurance voucher so that the
recipient is aware of the unsubsidised premium. In addition, donor support should be
conditional by requiring contingency and disbursement plans (Schäfer and Waters
2016; Surminski et al. 2016). A suggestion recently iterated by Schäfer and Waters
(2016) is that smart premium support should cover only part of the premium, for
example, only the markup (the risk and expense loads) while the beneficiary pays
just the actuarial fair value or pure premium.
The message this chapter holds for the L&D discussions is to advise caution
about relying on the market, alone, to provide insurance for fulfilling aspirations for
the WIM, and to recognise the criticality of international and public intervention
in climate insurance provision. Interventions can include subsidies, technical assis-
tance, capitalisation of insurance programs, provision of reinsurance and other types
of support that make insurance affordable to resource-poor and climate-sensitive
clients; interventions can also enable regulatory regimes and public-private arrange-
ments that exploit the potential for insurance to genuinely catalyse risk reduction far
beyond what has been accomplished by commercial insurers thus far. It is therefore
important to continue developing “smart” regional or national programs that explic-
itly combine insurance with loss prevention and that address the emerging equity
issues as climate change impacts the most vulnerable and least responsible. The
WIM Executive Committee continues to contemplate subsidies for pro-poor insur-
ance programs (Executive Committee to the WIM 2016), a measure that will grow
in importance if the insurance narrative continues to evolve from solidarity-based
humanitarian assistance to accountability for climate-attributed impacts.
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